What were the key reasons for the Jewish Bund’s demise in early revolutionary Russia?

A history essay exploring the causes of the fall of the General Jewish Labor Bund, a Jewish socialist party in early 20th-century Russia. Going beyond simple Cold War narratives, it argues that the fall of autonomous Jewish political organising was much more complex than mere brutal Soviet repression.

Author : David Schreiber

The State of Israel holds a near-monopoly in Jewish political discourse. Zionism, its
state doctrine, theorised by Herzl at the end of the 19th century, understood here as the
establishment of a Jewish nation-state in mandate Palestine, is often presented by its
proponents as a bulwark against antisemitism¹ Yet, this would have seemed unlikely in
Herzl’s time, especially in Eastern Europe. The Jewish masses within the Russian Empire
appeared instead to orient themselves towards social revolution. This is reflected in the
popularity of the General Jewish Labour Bund of Lithuania, Poland, and Russia, commonly
known as “the Bund” (Yiddish for “union”). The Bund did not seek to create a Jewish state in
Palestine, unlike its Zionist counterparts. Rather, it aimed for socialism and the emancipation
of Jews in Europe. Yet its history is seldom taught alongside the Zionist project. But what
were the key reasons for the Bund’s demise in early revolutionary Russia? This essay
argues that the Bund’s disappearance from political life in the new Soviet Union in 1921 was
not simply the result of brutal Bolshevik repression, as argued by historians like Henri
Minczeles, Philipp Mendes or Zvi Gitelman.² Rather, its demise stemmed primarily from
ideological convergence: many Bundists were drawn towards the Communist Party out of
genuine confidence in Soviet power. This essay will first consider the conventional
interpretation that attributes the Bund’s end to political sidelining within the Russian Left,
despite its considerable traction, ultimately leading to its repression after the Bolshevik
takeover. It will then argue that, although coercion played a role, the decisive factor was the
Bund’s voluntary realignment with Bolshevism, accelerated by the experience of the Civil
War pogroms and the international revolutionary conjuncture. Together, these developments
led many Bundists to see the Soviet project, rather than the Bund, as capable of realising the
socialist emancipation of Jews.

Firstly, the Bund’s early conflicts within Russian social democracy revealed the
incompatibility between its principle of Jewish national autonomy and the centralising
tendencies of the broader socialist movement. This tension would later contribute to its
marginalisation. As a founding member of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party
(RSDLP), the Bund soon came into conflict with other factions. This was most evident when
it asserted its exclusive right to represent the Jewish nation in the RSDLP at its Second
Congress in 1903. The dispute over the Bund’s claim for national autonomy crystallised
internal divisions within the RSDLP, undermining its position relative to other factions. The
Bund argued that any Jewish worker wishing to join the Social Democratic movement should
simply join them, which would then federate with the Russian party.³ Lenin’s Iskra faction,
advocates of revolutionary centralism and opponents of the economists who prioritised
immediate labour struggles, believed that such a federated structure would be “splitting the
proletariat”.⁴ Moreover, Menshevik Jewish figures like Trotsky and Martov also denounced
granting the Bund sole representation of the Jewish working class.⁵ After the vote rejecting
the federalist model, the Bundist delegates walked out of the congress.⁶ This marked the first
formal rupture between the Bund and Russian social democracy. The question of national
autonomy was ingrained in the Bund’s identity, and the refusal to uphold it was tantamount to
denying its role as the principal representative of Jewish workers. Therefore, the Bund’s
persistent sidelining within Russian socialism reflected not only organisational disputes but a
fundamental ideological divide that foreshadowed its eventual absorption into the dominant
Bolshevik current.

Nonetheless, the Bund’s continued activity after its rupture with the RSDLP showed
its resilience and capacity to embody an autonomous Jewish socialist voice. It was
readmitted to the RSDLP in 1906. Its strength during the 1905 Revolution, when the movement briefly flourished with 40,000 members amid Tsar Nicholas II’s promises of
democratic reform, impressed the party leadership. Upon its return, the Bund had to accept
the party’s platform but retained considerable organisational autonomy. These events
illustrate that, even before the Bolsheviks consolidated power, the Bund’s position was far
from precarious, and that it could carry a national emancipation project under freer political
conditions.

Further, the Bund’s reemergence in 1917 demonstrates that, despite years of
marginalisation, it remained a vital force within Russian socialism and continued to attract
substantial popular support. In the February Revolution, which ended Tsarist rule and
established a Provisional Government, the Empire’s Jews were finally granted equal rights.
This formal equality and broad range of political freedoms allowed the Bund to operate
legally, thus emerging from clandestinity. Membership returned to 1905 levels, and the Bund
became a major force within workers’ councils, better known as Soviets. The Soviets
became the main opposition to the Provisional Government, whose inaction in the face of
peasant and worker demands was increasingly apparent. This revival shows that the Bund’s
eventual disappearance cannot be seen as inevitable; its ideas still resonated deeply within
revolutionary politics before Bolshevik consolidation.

Finally, the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917 marked the decisive turning point in
the Bund’s trajectory, as the new regime’s centralising logic fundamentally constrained the
space for independent socialist movements. By October⁷, the Bolsheviks, under Lenin,
seized power in the name of the Soviets. The rest of the Left, including the Bund,
condemned this move, which was seen as a palace coup. The Mensheviks,
Socialist-Revolutionaries, and various other leftist currents joined forces, sometimes even
with the Whites, notorious royalists and antisemites, and foreign powers, in a war against the
Bolsheviks. When the Civil War was over, announcing the victory of the Reds who
subsequently outlawed opposition in 1921, the Bund progressively dissolved through internal
fractures. Some members were forced to accept the newly renamed Russian Communist Party’s power out of survival, while others clung to their political autonomy, ultimately fleeing
to the West, opening new Bundist chapters elsewhere, or abandoning political life altogether.
While the post-Civil War evolution of the Bund outside Russia is beyond the scope of this
essay, in both cited cases, this meant the end of an organised mass Jewish party. As
Mendes notes, “The Bund was destroyed by the Bolsheviks”.⁸ It could be seen, in line with
the conventional interpretation, that the Bund’s downfall is attributed to Bolshevik repression,
which made it impossible for an independent Jewish socialist movement to survive within the
emerging Soviet state.

However, the Bund’s demise cannot simply be attributed to a tragic product of
Bolshevik terror. In fact, many Bundists joined the Soviet project out of genuine conviction
rather than coercion, primarily because of the impact of Civil War pogroms, the Bolsheviks’
stance on the national question and the international revolutionary context, and finally,
because of internal debates that led to the Bund’s integration into the Russian Communist
Party.

Firstly, the Bund’s later alignment with Soviet power can be traced to the persistent
threat of pogroms, which made the protection of Jewish communities central to its political
mission and shaped its strategic decisions during the revolutionary period. The most violent
pogrom before the Civil War was the Kishinev pogrom, in modern-day Chișinău, which
occurred from 6 April to 7 April 1903. Initiated by Interior Minister von Plehve, it was
organised by the Bessarabian administration that governed the region comprising
present-day Moldova and parts of Ukraine. Minczeles provides a vivid account: “It left 49
dead and more than 500 wounded. Seven hundred houses and 600 shops, factories, and
workshops were looted and destroyed. Two thousand families were left homeless. Despite a
brief counterattack by Jewish butchers, the rioters ransacked the Jewish quarter, killing,raping, and looting”.⁹ This violence underscored the urgent need for organised Jewish
self-defence, a cause around which the Bund mobilised its supporters.

Although the Bundists effectively defended Jewish communities through their
self-defence squads, known as Boevie Otriady, the Civil War exposed them to
unprecedented levels of violence that reshaped their strategic choices. “Between 1917 and
1921, 1,236 violent incidents were recorded across 700 towns and villages, resulting in
approximately 60,000 Jewish deaths and half a million displaced”.¹⁰ However, it was not just
the Whites who committed pogroms. Ukrainian nationalists and social democrats were either
active participants or passive bystanders.¹¹ While antisemitism was rampant on all sides, the
only force genuinely resolved to protect Jews from violence and punish its own members for
any such violence was the Red Army.¹² Budnitskii’s understanding of the Bund allying with
Soviet power, while not agreeing with all its policies, seems more convincing than mere fear
of repression. “Unlike the Whites, the Reds refused to keep silent about [antisemitism]”,
“they actively attempted to stop anti-Jewish violence, and were willing to use all means at
their disposal to do so”.¹³ This demonstrated commitment to protecting Jewish lives, and
helped convince many Bundists that aligning with the victorious Bolsheviks offered the most
viable path to safeguarding their communities and advancing their political ideals. In addition to their effective response to pogroms, the Soviets’ evolving stance on the
national question in 1917 created conditions that encouraged many Bundists to reconsider
their opposition to Bolshevik power. In July, “the Bolsheviks accepted the Bund’s proposal
made at the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets to grant all nations autonomy and […]
vigorously participated in efforts throughout that year to combat antisemitism. In early 1918,
the RCP had formed a Jewish commissariat to oversee an autonomous Jewish community
in Russia, and later that year it established Jewish sections within its own ranks, providing Bundists an arena in which to continue their work in the Jewish community”.¹⁴ Beyond the
Russian context, the revolution that was sparking in Germany crystallised the Bolshevik
predictions of the collapse of capitalism. While the uprising did fail, according to Bundist
figure Moises Rafes, “The horror of the pogroms, combined with the impact of the German
Revolution, accelerated changing attitudes toward the RCP throughout the Bund”.¹⁵These
developments reinforced the Bund’s view that the Soviet project could advance its political
goals.

Further evidence that the Bund’s decline resulted from voluntary realignment rather
than Bolshevik coercion can be seen in its internal debates and strategic decisions. Noting
that “by 1919, the prospects of a Menshevik government were nonexistent—one supported
either the Soviets or the Whites”¹⁶ and that the Bund was already facing inner schisms: “In
some cities whole groups split off and joined the Communist Party”,¹⁷ it had to reconsider its
opposition with the Bolsheviks. In March 1919, at the Bund’s 11th Party Congress, while
maintaining considerable ideological distance from the Reds, the party voted to support the
Communist Party and recognised the Soviet government.¹⁸ One of the leaders of the party,
Esther Frumkin, declared, “The Red Army is our army”.¹⁹ Later, at its 12th conference in April
1920, a resolution showing a clear alliance with the Bolsheviks was adopted. Frumkin,
previously dubious about the Soviets but strategically inclined to their side, now seemed fully
confident in their project: “Soviet power is firmly taking the only road which can guarantee
the revolution”.²⁰ By 1921, the Bund had finally dissolved itself into the RCP,²¹ but not
because of Red pressure: “Bundists joined the Communist Party not in spite of the Bund but
in pursuit of the ideas that the Bund had fought for, ideas that the Soviets promised to realise”.²²Therefore, the Bund’s dissolution reflected genuine confidence in the Bolsheviks
rather than mere submission to repression.

Ultimately, the demise of the Bund in early Soviet Russia was not simply the outcome
of coercion or violent suppression. While Bolshevik repression and marginalisation within the
Russian Left contributed to the weakening of the party, the decisive factor was the voluntary
realignment of Bundists with the Soviet project. The Civil War pogroms, the Bolsheviks’
evolving stance on the national question, and international revolutionary developments
accelerated this shift, reflected by internal schisms. By choosing to see the Bolshevik regime
as a continuation of their own ideals rather than as their destroyer, Bundists ensured the end
of Bundism as an independent Jewish political force in Russia, marking a profound
transformation in the trajectory of Jewish socialism.

References

Budnitskii, Oleg. 2012. Russian Jews Between the Reds and the Whites, 1917-1920. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Gitelman, Zvi Y. 1972. Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Lenin, Vladimir. 1903. “no.34.” Iskra, February 15, 1903.
Mendes, Philipp. 2013. “The Rise and Fall of the Jewish Labor Bund.” Jewish Currents,
November 30, 2013.
Meyers, Joshua. 2019. “A Portrait of Transition: from the Bund to Bolshevism in the Russian
Revolution.” Jewish Social Studies 24.
Minczeles, Henri. 1995. Histoire générale du Bund. Paris: Editions Austral.
Mullin, Richard J. 2010. Lenin and the Iskra faction of the RSDLP: 1899-1903. Falmer:
University of Sussex.

Edited by: David Schreiber

Cover photo by: YIVO institute

1. (Herzl 1896) ↩︎
2. (Minczeles 1995; Mendes 2013; Gitelman 1972) ↩︎
3. (Mullin 2010, 174) ↩︎
4. (Lenin 1903) ↩︎
5. (Gitelman 1972, 42) ↩︎
6. (Mullin 2010, 174) ↩︎
7. November in the Gregorian calendar ↩︎
8. (Mendes 2013) ↩︎
9. (Minczeles 1995, 116) ↩︎
10. (Minczeles 1995, 321) ↩︎
11. (Meyers 2019, 120) ↩︎
12. (Gitelman 1972, 164) ↩︎
13. (Budnitskii 2012, 368) ↩︎
14. (Meyers 2019, 116) ↩︎
15. (Meyers 2019, 122) ↩︎
16. (Meyers 2019, 122) ↩︎
17. (Gitelman 1972, 170) ↩︎
18. (Meyers 2019, 122) ↩︎
19. (Budnitskii 2012, 358) ↩︎
20. (Gitelman 1972, 193) ↩︎
21. (Gitelman 1972, 219) ↩︎
22. (Meyers 2019, 127) ↩︎